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Force Majeure and Excuses in Smart Contracts 
Eric TJONG TJIN TAI* 
 
1. Introduction 
Smart contracts are an exciting development at the junction of computer programs 
and contracts. The main advantage of smart contracts is said to be the automatic 
performance of the obligations, which is thereby guaranteed due to the absence of 
human intervention once the contract is accepted and started. However, it is possible 
that smart contracts do not fare well when it comes to ensuring the protection of party 
interests in all cases that traditional contracts do.1 In this article I will examine 
whether smart contracts can allow for excuses for breach of contract. For reasons of 
space I will not discuss the related doctrines of withholding performance2 and 
hardship (unforeseen circumstances). 
First I will briefly introduce smart contracts and highlight a few important 
aspects (s. 2). Next I will provide a comparative overview of excuses, culminating in a 
‘common core’ of the rules of various jurisdictions, inspired by the DCFR (s. 3). 
Subsequently I will discuss whether and how excuses can be dealt with in smart 
contracts (s. 4).  
 
2. Characteristics of smart contracts 
Smart contracts have by now been covered by a number of articles and reports.3 Smart 
contracts are in essence programs that perform part of the contractual obligations, and 
                                                        
* Professor of Private Law, Tilburg University, and researcher at Tilburg Institute for Private law (TIP), 
t.f.e.tjongtjintai@tilburguniversity.edu. 
1 See also T.F.E. TJONG TJIN TAI, ‘Juridische aspecten van blockchain en smart contracts’, Tijdschrift 
voor Privaatrecht 2017 (54), p. 563-608, ‘Smart contracts en het recht’, Nederlands Juristenblad 
2017/146, p. 176-182. 
2 On which see , T.F.E. TJONG TJIN TAI, ‘Formalizing contract law for smart contracts’, ICAIL 2017, 
www.cs.bath.ac.uk/smartlaw2017/papers/SmartLaw2017_paper_1.pdf, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3038800. 
3 Most relevant: C.L. REYES, ‘Conceptualizing Cryptolaw’, Nebraska L. Rev. 2017 (96), p. 384-445, K. 
WERBACH & N. CORNELL, ‘Contracts Ex Machina’, Duke L.J. 2017 (67), p. 313-382, M. RASKIN, ‘The 
Law and Legality of Smart Contracts’, Georgetown Technology Review 2017/1, p. 305-341, A. SAVELYEV, 
‘Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law’, 
ssrn.com/abstract=2885241 (2016), M.L. PERUGINI & P. DAL CHECCO, ‘Smart Contracts: A 
Preliminary Evaluation’, ssrn.com/abstract=2729548 (2015), P. PAECH, ‘The Governance of 
Blockchain Financial Networks’, Modern Law Review 2017 (80), p. 1072-1100, E. MIK, ‘Smart 
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may contain and execute contractual conditions, as well as invoke physical remedies 
(such as withholding access to a room, interrupting the starter of a car). Although 
discussed before bitcoin,4 smart contracts were found to be only feasible in a restricted 
environments (in particular the financial sector). With the advent of bitcoin, a cheap 
and secure way has become available for actually performing payments. A payment 
transaction is in essence a simple instruction. The computers that are part of a 
blockchain network can also execute highly complex programs and instructions. 
Blockchain technology can thus be adapted fairly easy to process complex 
transactions. Thereby it is possible to model complete contracts.5 At present the most 
popular system is Ethereum, which offers a fully capable computer language, Solidity, 
for programming contracts.  
The paradigmatic way to use smart contracts in a smart contract system is that 
a user proposes a specific smart contract by making it available in the system. The 
contract has an identification number (id) and functions as an autonomous entity 
within the system, somewhat similar to how a website may operate on the Internet. 
Another user may then ‘accept’ the contract by communicating to it in some way, for 
example by making a nominal payment to it.6 The users or parties to the contract can 
communicate with and by means of the contract, for example by signaling that a 
physical package has been received, after which the contract automatically executes 
the payment for the package.7  
                                                                                                                                                              
Contracts: Terminology, Technical Limitations and Real World Complexity’, Journal of Law, 
Innovation and Technology 2017/2, p. 269-300, JEREMY M. SKLAROFF, ‘Smart Contracts and the Cost of 
Inflexibility’, Univ. Pennsylvania L. Rev. 2017 (166), p. 263-303, A.J. CASEY & A. NIBLETT, ‘Self-
Driving Contracts’, Journal of Corporation Law 2017 (43), p. 1-33.  
4 For example N. SZABO, ‘Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks’, 2 First Monday 
1997(9), at firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469/, N. SZABO, ‘The Idea of Smart 
Contracts’, at szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_idea.html, S. PEYTON JONES, J.-M. EBER & J. 
SEWARD, ‘Composing Contracts: An Adventure in Financial Engineering’, in ACM SIGPLAN 
International Conference on Functional Programming (ICFP) 2000, 280-292, H. SURDEN, ‘Computable 
Contracts’, UC Davis Law Review 2012, 629-700. 
5 S.M. MCJOHN & I. MCJOHN, ‘The Commercial Law of Bitcoin and Blockchain Transactions’, Suffolk 
University Law School Research Paper No. 16-13, at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2874463, point out 
that smart contracts actually resemble letters of credit. 
6 If the contract obliges one of the parties to pay a certain amount, the contract usually requires that 
party to pay the full amount up front, like a down payment or bank guarantee. The ‘money’ is for the 
duration of the contract locked within the contract. However, it is also possible that the contract 
involves periodic payments, and that it attempts to make a payment after each period, without requiring 
advance payment. 
7 See the example Safe Remote Purchase at solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/solidity-by-
example.html#safe-remote-purchase 
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In order to provide the requisite functionality needed by contract practice, the 
smart contract system needs to be able to interact with the outside world, otherwise it 
could only operate with conditional payments and signals of the users.  
The smart contract environment needs to allow smart contracts to send signals 
to external entities or objects, such as computers or robots, whereby the smart 
contract can operate in the real world without human intervention. An example would 
be a hotel room that unlocks once you make the payment for the room.  
Furthermore the contract needs to be able to receive signals from the outside 
world. The facility to receive inputs has been christened ‘oracles’. An ‘oracle’ is 
simply the entity or communication channel by which the smart contract system 
receives information about the external world.8 I will distinguish three kinds of 
oracles: automated oracles, TTP oracles, and expert oracles. 
An example of an automated oracle is an self-driving car that sends a signal if it 
registers that it has been involved in an accident. Other examples are input/output 
devices, sensors etcetera, connections to websites or the Internet at large.  
An oracle could also be connected to a human invididual, who thereby 
functions as a trusted third party (TTP). An example is the courier who signals that he 
has delivered the package to the address specified. This offers a means whereby the 
smart contract system can obtain information about a state of affairs that is fairly 
complex to determine.  
An oracle may offer even more complex services, in particular take an 
evaluative role, such as assessment of damage or quality of delivered goods. This may 
amount to an expert evaluation, such as exist in international trade. These have varied 
names, such as surveyor, certification agenty, conformity assessment body. It may also 
amount to providing judgement. The oracle thereby functions as an arbiter or judge. 
Although at present such an oracle can only be fulfilled by a human expert, it is 
possible that in the future sufficiently advanced algorithms could fulfill a similar role. 
The smart contract may outsource specific balancing judgements that are hard if not 
impossible to program, and in that way may be able to make the smart contract as a 
whole more fair or just. 
                                                        
8 MIK, JLIT 2017, p. 21-24 points out that smart contracts therefore require trust in these oracles. 
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3. The law on excuses for non-performance 
3.1. Introduction 
When parties conclude a contract, we may presume that they do so with the 
expectation that the obligations from the contract are to be performed.9 We may for 
the sake of the present analysis disregard the idea that a contract is simply a promise to 
pay damages if it is not performed.10 Indeed, it can be argued that smart contracts are 
useful precisely because they offer a means to ensure that the contract is actually going 
to be performed.11 The right of the creditor to performance is, however, not absolute. 
Every legal system recognises that the performance may be frustrated in various ways, 
without thereby making the debtor liable for breach of contract. These possibilities can 
be discussed under the general heading of ‘excuses’. 
 The law of excuses for non-performance is the result of a long and complicated 
history.12 There used to be a variety of specific solutions in various jurisdictions, but 
scholarschip and recent codifications have led to a closer approximation of the 
national rules.13 I will argue that the differences can be disregarded for the purpose of 
implementation in smart contracts, and that we can assume a essential functional 
similarity.  
 
3.2. Excuses and the DCFR 
One of the main principles of contract law is that the debtor has to perform the 
obligations that he has undertaken in the contract, and that he is liable for non-
performance. The creditor may obtain damages, or ask for an order for specific 
performance, or terminate the contract. The liability of the debtor is, however, limited 
                                                        
9 See about this issue J.M. SMITS, D. HAAS & G. HESEN (eds), Specific Performance in Contract Law: 
National and Other Perspectives (Antwerpen: Intersentia 2008). 
10 As stated by Oliver Wendell Holmes, but not really accepted anymore, see J. CARTWRIGHT, Contract 
Law (Oxford: Bloomsbury, 3rd ed. 2016), p. 273. 
11 RASKIN 2017. 
12 F. RANIERI, Europäisches Obligationenrecht (Vienna: Springer, 3rd ed., 2009), Ch. 6. 
13 See the comparative work in H. BEALE, B. FAUVARQUE-COSSON, J. RUTGERS, D. TALLON & S. 
VOGENAUER (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed., 2010), Ch. 12, 19, 23-25, M. SCHMIDT-KESSEL & K. MAYER, ‘Supervening events and force 
majeure’, in: J.M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2nd ed., 
2012), p 839, H KÖTZ, European Contract Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2017), 
chapters 12, 14 and 15. 
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insofar as the non-performance has a cause for which he is not responsible and for 
which he should not be held accountable. This should not be assumed too quickly: 
while the debtor may not be accountable directly for theft by a third party, he may still 
be accountable for the loss of a good if he could have taken further preventive 
measures against theft. Non-accountability is mostly assumed only in cases of 
overpowering circumstances, which are generally called force majeure.  
However, even if the debtor is not accountable for the cause, the non-
performance may still have consequences. This applies in particular if performance is 
temporarily or permanently impossible. In that case the creditor cannot obtain an 
order for specific performance of the obligation, but this does not block other 
remedies. He may at the very least withhold performance, and terminate the 
contract,14 depending on the precise circumstances. Furthermore, impossibility itself 
does not rule out that the impossibility was due to a cause for which the debtor was 
accountable, in which case damages may be awarded. Hence the available remedies in 
case of impossibility may be quite like those for excuses in general, although not 
identical. The interplay between impossibility and excuses has in the past led to 
complicated rules and exceptions.15 Modern legal systems have fortunately managed 
to reach an appropriate solution by distinguishing clearly between the attributability of 
the cause of non-performance, and the available remedies (liability, termination). 
Impossibility is thereby relegated to being a particular kind of cause of non-
performance, a potential excuse for certain remedies. 
Part of the development of impossibility was the recognition of various kinds of 
impossibility.16 Besides factual impossibility (such as delivery of a painting that was 
destroyed by fire) and practical impossibility (such as delivery of a ring that had sunk 
to the bottom of the ocean), the law sometimes recognises moral impossibility (for 
example, the actor who refuses to perform as he has to attend the death bed of his 
wife). Closely related is the case that the obligation could only be performed by the 
debtor in violation of some legal prohibition (for example prohibition of exporting 
                                                        
14 KÖTZ, European Contract Law, Ch. 13. 
15 RANIERI, Europäisches Obligationenrecht, Ch. 6. 
16 KÖTZ, European Contract Law, p. 206-207. 
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currency); thereby the doctrines of illegality and public policy (which may invalidate 
the whole contract) are related to moral impossibility. 
Art. III-3:104 DCFR captures the modern understanding of contractual 
excuses. It describes the general rule for excuses: these are impediments to 
performance which are beyond the debtor’s control and could not be reasonably be 
expected to have been avoided or overcome. The criteria of this article may be 
interpreted as a redefinition of the general requirement of attribution of impediments. 
The article seems to focus particularly on impossibility, as it only provides specific 
rules for temporary and permanent impediments (art. III-3:104(3) and (4) DCFR). 
 A relevant distinction has to be made between obligations of result and 
obligations of means (obligations to observe reasonable care and skill).17 For the breach 
of the latter kind of obligation there is no valid excuse: one cannot excuse a lack of care 
or skill. The practical problem is rather how to prove the breach of the obligation. I 
will therefore disregard obligations of means as not relevant for the present topic.18  
Important in practice is that parties may contractually agree on which causes 
are or are not legally attributable to the debtor, by way of a force majeure clause.19 
Such a clause makes it easier to determine whether an impediment is a valid excuse, 
and allows parties to allocate contractual risks in a way they find appropriate.  
In case of non-performance the law generally requires the creditor to notify the 
debtor of the non-performance. This warns the debtor (who may not even know of the 
non-performance, for example if a package has not been delivered) and allows him to 
remedy this. Notification furthermore allows the debtor to argue that the non-
performance is due to an impediment outside his control, which constitutes force 
majeure. During this discussion, the creditor may withhold performance, which in 
essence means that he deliberately does not perform a counterobligation to enforce his 
right to the non-performed obligation (art. III-3:401 DCFR).  
 The outlines of the law as described by the DCFR can be traced also in modern 
codifications. 
 
                                                        
17 KÖTZ, European Contract Law, p. 246-251, T.F.E. TJONG TJIN TAI, ‘Professional diligence and the 
UCP Directive’, European Review of Contract Law 12/1 (2016), p. 1-20. 
18 MIK, JLIT 2017, p. 21 finds such obligations not suitable for programming in smart contracts. 
19 Explicated in the comments: DCFR, Vol. 1, p. 783 (Comments A. General). 
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3.3. German law 
German contract law has been modified extensively in 2002.20 In the original 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) the main category of excuses was impossibility, which 
was quickly found to be too limited for a fair distribution of contractual risks. Since the 
reform of German contract law in 2002, the BGB offers rules for excuses besides 
impossibility. The main rules are as follows: 
- the creditor has no claim to performance if this is impossible for the debtor or for 
anyone (§ 275(1) BGB).21 
- the debtor may (even in case of impossibility)22 have to pay damages for breach of 
obligation, except if he is not responsible (nicht zu vertreten) for the breach (§ 280(1) 
BGB, cf. 286(4) BGB)) 
- the creditor may terminate (Rücktritt) the contract in case of breach, even if the 
debtor is not responsible (§ 323 BGB). 
The liability for damages is therefore fault-dependent,23 but termination is available 
regardless of responsibility for the breach. 
As regards the responsibility of the debtor, this is determined according to § 
276-278 BGB. The debtor is liable for intentional and negligent non-performance (§ 
276 BGB), as well as for auxiliaries (§ 278 BGB). He is not liable for obstacles to 
performance that were not foreseeable and for which he has also not taken on the 
risk.24 Parties may, however, make differing contractual arrangements.25  
 
3.4. French law 
French contract law has recently been recodified,26 which has significantly clarified 
the doctrine of excuses. In case of non-performance, the creditor may invoke several 
remedies, including termination and damages (art. 1217 Cc). However, damages are 
                                                        
20 B.S. MARKESINIS, H. UNBERATH, A. JOHNSTON, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise 
(Oxford: Hart 2006), also S. GRUNDMANN, ‘Germany and the Schuldrechtsmodernisierung 2002’, 
European Review of Contract Law 2005/1, p. 129-148. 
21 MARKESINIS, German Law, p. 406 
22 § 283 BGB, MARKESINIS, German Law, p. 456. 
23 MARKESINIS, German Law, p. 444. 
24 Bamberger Kommentar 3rd ed. (Unberath) § 280 rndnr. 34, also § 286, nr. 51-59. 
25 Unberath § 286, nr. 52. It is also possible to assume the risk, by a ‘Garantie’ (Münchener 
Kommentar (W. Ernst), 5th ed., München: Beck 2007), § 280, nr. 24). 
26 1 October 2016, see Ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016. 
Published in: European Review of Private Law 2018-6 (vol. 26), p. 787-804 
 8 
not due in case of force majeure,27 when there is an event that impedes the performance 
of the obligation, which escapes the control of the debtor, and which could not 
reasonably be foreseen at the conclusion of the contract, and of which the effects 
cannot be evaded through appropriate measures (art. 1218(1) Cc).28 Force majeure 
includes impossibility, as is clear from art. 1282(2) Cc, where it is stated that 
temporary impossibility may lead to suspension of the contractual obligation, except if 
it is of such a nature that it may justify termination. An exception to the duty to 
performance is withholding performance, ‘refuser d'exécuter ou suspendre 
l'exécution de sa propre obligation’ (art. 1217 and 1219 Cc).  
 
3.5. English law29 
English contract law on excuses takes as its basis that liability for breach is strict.30 The 
justification for strict liability in contract is that the debtor voluntarily accepted the 
obligation. However, not all contractual liability is strict. For example, in the case of a 
services involving an obligation of reasonable care, the debtor is only liable for breach 
if it is established that he was at fault.31 This, in effect, is the distinction between 
obligations of result and obligations of means (s. 3.2). 
The general doctrine of an exception to strict liability is called frustration.32 In 
the leading case Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] 
UKHL 3,33 it is described as follows: “frustration occurs whenever the law recognises 
that, without the default of either party, a contractual obligation has become incapable 
of being performed because the circumstance in which performance is called for would 
render it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract. 
                                                        
27 Art. 1231-1 Cc. 
28 ‘lorsqu'un événement échappant au contrôle du débiteur, qui ne pouvait être raisonnablement prévu 
lors de la conclusion du contrat et dont les effets ne peuvent être évités par des mesures appropriées, 
empêche l'exécution de son obligation par le débiteur.’ 
29 Chitty on Contracts, vol. I (London: Thomson Reuters, 36th ed. 2015).  
30 N. ANDREWS, Contract rules: decoding English law (Antwerp: Intersentia 2016), p. 266, SMITH, Law of 
Contract, p. 170-171, E. MCKENDRICK, Contract Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7th ed. 2016), p 
749, KÖTZ, European Contract Law, p. 252-254. 
31 E. MCKENDRICK, Contract Law, p. 750, SMITH, Atiyah’s Introduction, p. 170-171. 
32 J. CARTWRIGHT, Contract Law (Oxford: Bloomsbury, 3rd ed. 2016), p. 261, N. ANDREWS, Contract 
rules, p. 266, S.A. SMITH, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon, 6th ed. 
2006), p. 167-169, 182-192. 
33 AC 696 (HL). 
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Non haec in foedera veni. It was not this that I promised to do.”34 This includes cases 
where the underlying purpose of the contract has been defeated.35 The supervening 
event may not be self-induced.36  
The literature shows various attempts at categorization. Categories of 
frustration that are generally recognised are impossibility37 (including moral38 or 
practical impossibility39), frustration of purpose,40 supervening illegality,41 hardship.42 
Because contractual liability is strict, it is not necessary to have a general doctrine of 
force majeure, in contrast to civil law systems where it has to be decided on a case by 
case basis whether a certain cause constitutes force majeure. In English law, 
everything is attributable except if it is covered by a specific force majeure clause, or is 
one of the (other) excuses discussed above. There is not a single factor which is 
decisive for frustration; courts use a ‘multi-factorial’ approach’.43  
A contract can contain a force majeure clause,44 releasing a party from its 
obligations for certain rare events, whereby parties have allocated the risk to a specific 
party.45 Such a clause may be viewed as a species of frustration or a valid excuse,46 or 
alternatively as not being part of frustration.47 Force majeure clauses are interpreted 
narrowly, and in particular cannot be invoked when the event in the clause is caused 
by the negligence of the party relying upon the clause.48 
                                                        
34 Lord Radcliffe, [1956] AC 696, 728-9. 
35 N. ANDREWS, Contract rules, p. 257. This is analogous with the German notion of Wegfall der 
Geschäftsgrundlage. 
36 Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd [1935] UKPC 1, J. CARTWRIGHT, Contract Law, p. 
265, N. ANDREWS, Contract rules, p. 259, E. MCKENDRICK, Contract Law, p. 708. 
37 SMITH, Atiyah’s Introduction, p. 183, E. MCKENDRICK, Contract Law, p. 715. See Taylor v Caldwell 
[1863] EWHC QB J1. 
38 This may also be said to include illegality, cf. N. ANDREWS, Contract rules, p. 252. 
39 Cf. N. ANDREWS, Contract rules, p. 253 
40 E. MCKENDRICK, Contract Law, p. 716. SMITH, Atiyah’s Introduction, p. 184 speaks of frustration of 
the common venture. 
41 Considered as separate category by E. MCKENDRICK, Contract Law, p. 715, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, 
nr. 23-024. 
42 SMITH, Atiyah’s Introduction, p. 187. 
43 E. MCKENDRICK, Contract Law, p. 702, refering to Edwinton Commercial Coproration v Tsavliris 
Russ [2007] EWCA Civ 547. 
44 For example see Great Elephant v. Trafigura Beheer BV and Others (Crudesky) [2013] EWCA Civ 
905. 
45 N. ANDREWS, Contract rules, p. 248. 
46 N. ANDREWS, Contract rules, p. 266, SMITH, Atiyah’s Introduction, p. 188-189. 
47 J. CARTWRIGHT, Contract Law, p. 264, 269. 
48 E. MCKENDRICK, Contract Law, p. 714, refering to the leading case J. Lauritzen A.S. v Wijsmuller 
B.V., (The Super Servant Two) [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1. 




The civil law systems discussed above follow the broad outlines of the DCFR 
regarding excuses.49 German and French law operate with the notion of an 
impediment (cause of non-performance) and require responsibility or attributability.  
Although at first sight the common law approch in England seems to be rather 
different, it follows essentially the same structure. While common law starts fromt he 
presumption of attributability of the impediment (‘strict liability’), there are several 
exceptions, such as impossibility and supervening illegality, while force majeure 
clauses allow further exceptions. In this way a substantial number of causes of non-
performance do not lead to liability, which effectively is the same result as in civil law 
systems.  
 Hence there is sufficient ground to assume a general consensus on the law of 
excuses. In case of non-performance there are several ways in which the debtor may 
succesfully excuse himself for the usual consequences of non-performance.50 These 
excuses are categorised in various ways in different jurisdictions, but can for the 
purposes of the present research be lumped together as simply being causes for non-
performance which may be excusable, or, in civil law terms, may be non-attributable. 
Even illegality or public order can be viewed as impedements (even though they may 
also lead to nullity of the contract). Most jurisdictions start from a presumption of 
attributability, in other words have a fairly strict regime of contractual liability.  
 Practical problems arise in case of multiple causes of non-performance, in 
particular if some causes can be attributed to the creditor as well, and in cases of 
temporary impossibility and/or repairable breach of an obligation. Here I cannot 
discuss these in depth. 
 
4. Implementing excuses in smart contracts 
4.1. Introduction 
                                                        
49 Also KÖTZ, European Contract Law, p. 245. 
50 Besides the requirement of default, which is part of the doctrinal discussion on remedies and will not 
be discussed here. 
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An obvious approach is to try to translate or implement the legal rules in code.51 
Insofar as smart contracts can easily accommodate the legal rules, there is no tension. 
Insofar as it may prove difficult to fully program the legal rules, the choice can be 
made either to emulate the rule as far as possible (possibly by outsourcing the legal 
assessment through an expert oracle), or to deviate from the law by replacing the rule 
with a simpler hard-and-fast rule. By taking the latter route, parties may lose some of 
the protection that the more complex or vague legal rule offers.  
 The general outline of the law of excuses is: 
- find the cause of the non-performance, and  
- determine whether the cause is attributable to the debtor. 
I will focus on this two-step process.  
 
4.2. Determining the cause of non-performance 
The first step in programming excuses in a smart contract is to determine the cause of 
non-performance. Certain causes may be easy to foresee and program into the 
contract, in particular where these causes are part of the smart contract environment. 
An example might be insufficient balance of the cryptocurrency.52 Other causes may 
be external and may be more difficult to assess. Detecting such causes would require 
the use of an oracle. The (non)delivery of a package can for example be ascertained by 
the courier, who in that way functions as an oracle. If the non-delivery is a cause of 
non-performance, this offers a simpe way of determining whether this cause is 
present. But other causes may be rarer, harder to foresee, detect, and code into the 
contract. Examples are strikes, bad weather, general break-down of Internet.  
While it is theoretically possible that in time best practices develop by which 
smart contracts can simply include long lists of possible causes (s. 4.6), the 
determination of the cause is further complicated because dependent upon the kind of 
contract there may be different causes that are relevant, and different ways in which it 
can be ascertained that they occured. A contract of sale has different causes of non-
performance than a credit contract.  
                                                        
51 REYES, Neb. LR 2017, p. 415. 
52 Although smart contracts usually require payment in advance which is only paid out to the other 
party when sufficient conditions are fulfilled, this is not always the case, such as in the example of 
periodic payment of a car lease. 
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 This problem may be evaded by allowing a general exception of ‘force 
majeure’ which may be invoked by the debtor, and works by calling an expert oracle. 
Thereby the contract enlists the aid of an outside expert or adjudicator. This in effect 
simply means allowing ADR or ODR within the smart contract. The major 
disadvantage of this approach is that this effectively denies most of the benefits that 
smart contracts would have, in particular by breaking the automatic execution of the 
contract. For that reason I will not expand on this. Incidentally, invoking expert 
oracles also has the disadvantage that it may induce a disgruntled contract party to 
hold the oracle liable for a faulty opinion, or even threaten to do so, which could lead 
the oracle to delay his opinion until a clear court decision. This opens up a weakness in 
the supposed automatic enforcement of the contract. 
 A solution more in the spirit of smart contracts might be to operate similar to 
most legal systems and actual contracts, by starting from the presumption that breach 
is attributable, and only allowing a limited set of foreseeable relevant causes as an 
excuse. Any remaining, unforeseen causes would simply be at the risk of the debtor. 
This is not per se unfair, given the extensive attribution of causes in most 
jurisdictions. The debtor will usually be in the best position to identify possible 
impediments and take precautionary measures, and may decide which risks he won’t 
accept. The contractual force majeure clause is not really different from this.  
 A smart contract force majeure clause still has three complications: (i) 
determining what is the relevant cause, (ii) separating causes due to the creditor, and 
(iii) following proper procedure.   
(i) A cause may be the consequence of an underlying, earlier cause. The non-
delivery of a package may or may not be attributable, depending upon the reason why 
the package was not delivered: was this due to a strike, the non-acceptance of the 
package by the debtor, a flood or a war which made delivery impossible? Hence the 
non-delivery itself need not be the cause but only puts us on the trail for the actual 
cause! Indeed, there may be several factors which prima facie appear to be relevant 
causes: it may require sophisticated legal analysis to determine what is the actually 
relevant cause.  
(ii) A further complication arises if one cause is attributable to the creditor 
(such as non-acceptance of the package): in that case there may be a valid excuse, even 
Published in: European Review of Private Law 2018-6 (vol. 26), p. 787-804 
 13 
if another contributing cause is attributable to the debtor. The non-acceptance in turn 
may be justified if, for example, the package clearly does not contain the item ordered 
(which might be visible because the package is too small). This brief analysis shows 
that even if some facts are clear, a further investigation may be required to determine 
whether there is not an underlying fact which changes whether the fact forms a valid 
excuse or not. This cannot be determined in the abstract. The determination of 
attributability is connected with determining the cause.  
(iii) In actual legal practice there usually has to be a discussion between parties 
to determine the cause of non-performance: this process is captured in the rules 
regarding notification of non-performance.53 Although such a dialogue may be 
programmed to some extent in a smart contract (as that can code communication 
between parties), this is hard to do in a predictable rule-based manner.54 In a court 
procedure parties subsequently may take opposing positions regarding the relevant 
cause, and are required to provide proof, which allows the court to come to an 
informed decision on the identification of the actual cause. However, this whole 
process is ex-post, and does not help to code how the smart contract should behave 
during execution. Legal rules tend to take the court’s perspective (ex post), and not 
the perspective of parties during execution of the contract (ex ante).55 
The above discussion shows that the developer of a smart contract would, if 
the contract involves significant monetary value, do well to make a thorough 
investigation of possibly relevant causes of breach, and possibilities of interaction 
between causes. Case law and doctrine may provide many examples. For simpler 
contracts or contracts with little monetary value, such an exercise may be needlessly 
thorough as parties may be willing to take the unknown risks of unforeseen causes of 
breach. For more complicated cases it is however hard to code all relevant possibilities 
of interacting causes and deal with these in a satisfactory way. To do so, it would be 
necessary to program a large part of a hypothetical procedural discussion into the 
smart contract. This seems at present practically impossible. 
                                                        
53 See also art. III-3:104(5) DCFR. 
54 TJONG TJIN TAI, ICAIL 2017. 
55 As pointed out by WERBACH & CORNELL 2017, p. 361 and MIK, JLIT 2017, p. 17. 
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At first blush it seems only feasible to program (a) a list of easily identifiable 
possible causes that can be identified through normal automatic oracles, or can non-
contestably be verified through simple TTP oracles, and (b) a presumption that such a 
cause, if present in a certain time-frame actually is the actual relevant cause of the 
non-performance. Multiple causality and impediments due to the creditor seem to be 
too difficult to deal with at present.  
 
4.3. Determining the attributability of the cause 
Assuming that the cause or causes of breach have been determined, the next step is to 
determine the attributability of the cause. Although the general rule of attributability 
in civil law systems is an open norm that requires judicial assessment and therefore is 
hard to program, in contractual practice the uncertainty of court discretion is usually 
(partly) bypassed by force majeure clauses, which spell out causes that count or do not 
count as force majeure. In principle such a clause could be programmed as a rule in a 
smart contract. However, there are two complications. 
Firstly, contract practice can operate with fairly broad and open categories of 
causes.56 In case of a dispute, parties and the court will be able to interpret the 
categories of causes and decide whether a specific state of affairs can be considered to 
be such a cause. Smart contracts, on the contrary, require precisely programmable 
definitions of causes.57 To operationalise a cause it needs to be clearly defined. This 
may partly be solved by relying on a TTP oracle, but for more complicated cases an 
expert oracle would be required. This oracle would offer a binding decision as to 
whether there is force majeure. However, the effect is that the smart contract 
functions as a normal contract, where a dispute about attributability of a cause of non-
performance is ultimately decided by an independent third party, typically a court or 
arbitration panel. This would be time consuming and would offer parties possibilities 
for inhibiting the execution of the smart contract, by invoking force majeure. 
Secondly, attributability in practice is not only determined by looking at the 
specific cause in isolation: it may require taking into account other circumstances of 
the case. A strike may count as force majeure, but probably not if the strike is caused 
                                                        
56 SKLAROFF 2017, p. 279-286, describing the benefits of using general standards in contracts. 
57 Cf. WERBACH & CORNELL 2017, p. 367 on the difficulty to program force majeure. 
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by clearly unacceptable and unnecessary behaviour by the debtor. The non-obtaining 
of a license may seem force majeure, but not if the debtor received two licenses for 
five boats and decided to allocate the licenses to boats other than the boat which was 
contracted about.58 
If we summarize this and the preceding section, we find that for force majeure 
we are left with a choice between either:  
- a simple default rule that lists a number of circumstances that count as force majeure 
and that are identified through automated or TTP oracles, where causality is 
presumed (given a relevant time-frame), or 
- a simple reference to an expert oracle. 
Once it has been determined that there is in fact force majeure, the 
consequences can be programmed in a straightforward manner. Force majeure stands 
in the way of invoking a remedy for non-performance, as there is no breach. The 
creditor may, however, terminate the contract. Termination is also fairly easy to 
program (although it may require considerable legal acumen to correctly draft rules for 
everything that has to be arranged around and after termination, such as returning 
advance payments, valuation of partial performance).  
 
4.4. Specific categories of excuses 
The above analysis applies largely also to specific categories of excuses.  
Impossibility can to a large extent be analysed similarly to force majeure. It is 
simply a specific kind of impediment. One difference between impossibility and force 
majeure, however, is that it is not common to find clauses that determine what counts 
as impossibility. This is insofar to be expected as absolute impossibility exists 
regardless of a contractual clause. However, for moral impossibility it could be feasible 
to add contractual rules. For a smart contract it will be necessary to add rules to 
determine the presence of impossibility.  
A complication is that impossibility may have specific consequences that differ 
from excuses in general. Impossibility may have to be recognised as a specific kind of 
impediment. This may, however be difficult: as we already discussed it is hard to 
                                                        
58 Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd [1935] UKPC 1 
Published in: European Review of Private Law 2018-6 (vol. 26), p. 787-804 
 16 
explain in the abstract how to determine what is the relevant cause of non-
performance, and similarly it is difficult to next determine whether such a cause forms 
an actual impediment which cannot be overcome in any way, as this may involve 
knowledge of the world in general. That the courier has an accident may lead to 
‘impossibility’ if the package is broken, or may be overcome if it is a general item that 
can be sent by a new package. Similarly determining whether impossibility is 
temporary or permanent requires a sophisticated analysis which seems infeasible for a 
procedural programming language. At present such an analysis can only be realised 
through an expert oracle.  
A smart contract alternative would be not to fully model the legal rules, but 
rather to only allow those forms of impossibility that have been programmed in the 
smart contract. This effectively means that all other forms of impossibility are at the 
risk of the debtor. Conversely, the contract might simply add that the debtor can 
always invoke impossibility. However, such a clause can be easily abused as the debtor 
thereby can invoke it whenever he does not feel like performing.  
 Actually determining when there is a case of impossibility is complicated as 
well. Some kinds of causes could be implemented in theory fairly well, such as a 
general breakdown of the Internet, but others might require complicated assessments 
of data or factual situations. Such cases would probably have to rely on TTP oracles, 
except if technological advances make automated algorithmic oracles more powerful.59  
For illegality and public policy again a complicated analysis would be required.60 
Given the rapid changes in the regulatory landscape concerning cryptocurrencies, the 
possibility of mandatory law prohibiting the conclusion or performance of certain 
contracts is far from theoretical. Determining whether there is a public prohibition 
requires a legal analysis, not a factual analysis of causes. The only practical way to 
incorporate this possibility in a smart contract is at present again to have an expert 
oracle, which may be called when a party invokes the excuse of illegality.  
 
4.5. The limits of smart contracts and the evolution of excuses 
                                                        
59 Such algorithms would then still have to connect to relevant sensors and data inputs, which is not a 
self-evident problem.  
60 Cf. WERBACH & CORNELL 2017, p. 372-373. 
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The above analysis is fairly pessimistic as to the possibility of fully capturing the 
complexities and protection that the doctrine of contractual excuses offers. This is in 
line with the position of Sklaroff, who argues that smart contracts shift the costs of 
contracting to the pre-contracting stage, as everything has to be drafted in the 
contract.61 Indeed, existing contractual practice benefits from vague standards, as this 
helps to reduce costs.62 In contrast, Casey and Niblett are optimistic and argue that 
smart contracts would not need excuses, as they would already have covered every 
eventuality as a condition.63 However, they do not support their statement with a 
substantial analysis as the above. 
 To be true, there are two possible lines of defense against an overly pessimistic 
standpoint. First of all, the practical problems described above may partly be resolved 
by experience over time (and by learning from examples in case law). Given sufficient 
time it is possible that smart contract platforms would evolve best practices,64 which 
would provide standard functions that contain standard provisions for most relevant 
and important kinds of impediments, allowing users to pick which they want or not. 
This would amount to a very extensive force majeure clause. Admittedly some issues 
(in particular multiple causation and determining the actual cause) may be too difficult 
to model completely (s. 4.2). 
 Secondly, it may be argued that algorithmic prediction may offer solutions for 
complex cases.65 This assessment, again, seems overly optimistic: it ignores the 
current limitations of algorithms (which in essence do not much more than pattern-
recognition and qualification), the extent of variation in actual contract practice, and 
the problem of multiple causality. 
 A more fundamental problem with the approach of smart contracts is that 
contract law is not about ex ante regulation (which is what smart contracts focus on), 
but rather is designed for ex post adjudication.66 Furthermore, the well-known 
relational theory of contracting is at odds with the way in which smart contracts 
                                                        
61 SKLAROFF 2017, p. 292, refering to D. TAPSCOTT & A. TAPSCOTT, Blockchain Revolution 2016, p. 103. 
62 SKLAROFF 2017, p. 293-295, MIK 2017, p. 19-20. 
63 CASEY & NIBLETT, ‘Self-Driving Contracts’, p. 24.  The translation of excuses to contractual 
conditions is, from the point of view of the present analysis, irrelevant. 
64 WERBACH & CORNELL 2017, p. 374-375, PAECH 2017, p. 1097. 
65 CASEY & NIBLETT, ‘Self-Driving Contracts’, p. 24.   
66 S. 4.2. 
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perceive contracts.67 Complex business situations involve relations which are only 
partially captured in contracts, and such relations need a kind of flexibility that is 
fundamentally at odds with the rigidity of smart contracts. Indeed, it appears that in 
business practice smart contracts may be used primarily for executing parts of a 
broader framework contract, such as financial securities and options. Used in this way 
there is nothing special about smart contracts, as they are only a mode of performance 
of a normal contract. 
 However, in situations where the relational view of contracting does not hold, 
there may be real benefits to smart contracts. An example is a remote purchase of little 
monetary value.68 Such cases involve one-off transactions where no long-term relation 
is involved, while there is no practical possibility to invoke the protection of the law 
(due to costs and distance). It seems likely that parties may in such circumstances 
prefer to have only limited, actually enforceable remedies, instead of none at all. A 
hard-and-fast rule may therefore be acceptable here. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As the above analysis shows, smart contracts are not very well suited to deal with the 
finesses that are currently expected when it comes to excuses to performance. In 
particular problems of exhaustively coding causes, dealing with multiple causes, and 
attributing causes, are far more complicated than is feasible at present for 
straightforward coding. In case a party raises an excuse, the contract could either call 
the help of an expert oracle – which amounts to invoking arbitration, thereby 
acknowledging defeat of the purpose of smart contracts – or refusing to provide for the 
nuances of excuses in practice, which amounts to a hard-and-fast rule. Only by 
extensive development of best practices is improvement to be expected. 
                                                        
67 WERBACH & CORNELL 2017, p. 367, Similarly K.E.C. LEVY, ‘Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: 
Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and The Social Workings of Law’, 3 Engaging Science, Technology, 
and Society 2017, p. 1-15. 
68 TJONG TJIN TAI, ICAIL 2017. 
